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The political system, through which political decisions are made, has transformed 
remarkably in Korea from an authoritarian system during the 1960s and 1970s, to 
democratisation in the late 1980s, and further to the current liberal-democratic 
political system. Theories of economic development abound. Given the well-known 
ideas for economic development, a burning question arises as to why certain countries 
are able to take advantage of these ideas to achieve economic development, while 
others fail. In this regard, Olson (2000) argues convincingly that differences in per 
capita income across countries are due mainly to differences in the quality of 
institutions and economic policies. It is thus the political system that plays a critical 
role in economic performance, as economic polices and formal institutions are 
established through the political decision-making process. Nonetheless, little attention 
has been paid to the effects of the Korean political system on its economic 
development. There is a paucity of information and literature. As an attempt to fill the 
void in the literature, this paper examines and assesses the impacts of the Korean 
political system on its economic development with a focus on the Lee Myung-bak 
government.1 
 
2. Effects of Political Systems on Economic Performance 
 
While a vast literature in political science and political economy is dedicated to the 
causality running from economic performance to political systems, there is however 
little literature on the effects of regime type on economic performance (Przeworski 
and Limongi, 1993). For most theoretical and empirical studies in this area, political 
systems are generally characterised simply as authoritarian or democratic. It is a moot 
point to suggest that authoritarian regimes may produce economic outcomes superior 
to those of democracies after the Cold War ended in the early 1990s. Yet a contrast 
between the authoritarian and democratic regimes in their impacts on economic 
performance is particularly relevant to the Korean case. One of the positive arguments 
that authoritarianism is beneficial to economic growth revolves around the assumption 
                                                 
1 Political systems for this study are referred to as ‘regime types’ as in the political science literature. 
The study of the effects of economic development on political systems is beyond of the scope of this 
paper.    
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that authoritarian regimes have a greater propensity to accumulate investment than 
democracies (Kohli et al., 1984; Cohen, 1985). As authoritarians are not concerned 
much with democratic elections, they can pursue growth policy decisively without 
much concern about policy ramifications on society and income distribution (Haggard, 
1990: 261). This proposition depends on the nature and competence of the 
authoritarian regime and the time horizons authoritarians take. An authoritarian could 
be a benevolent dictator or a predatory one surrounded by corrupt political elites. The 
time horizon and moral probity of authoritarian elites cannot be judged ex ante, 
although authoritarianism has been seen to promote short-run growth in some 
developing countries.  
 
 Arguments in favour of democracy as beneficial to economic performance 
maintain that, while authoritarianism may promote short-run growth, democratic rule 
is more conducive to a sustained and equitable growth in the long run. For a country 
with a reasonably high level of development, in particular, further development may 
be achieved through creativity, innovation and business entrepreneurship. For such a 
country, political pluralism provides the underlying conditions for a competitive 
market economy that is required for innovation and new technology development 
(Harrison, 1985). To this Harrison (1985) adds that that authoritarianism, as compared 
to democracy, suppresses the creativity of individuals. Under democracy, lesser 
distributional conflicts will arise because democracy, by its very nature, must 
accommodate to some degree the claims of the poorer and more numerous sectors of 
society.  
 
 As the arguments for either authoritarianism or democracy are in essence 
based on critiques of the other system, it is difficult to choose a favourable one from 
the theoretical perspective. Hence, a number of empirical studies have been 
undertaken. The findings of empirical studies vary widely depending on the period 
and the regions of the studies, and are inconclusive.2 A number of empirical studies 
find no relationship or only qualified relationship between regime types and economic 
performance (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Weede, 1996; Ersson and Lane, 1996; 
Przeworski et al., 2000; Gerring, et al., 2005).3  
 
The above survey of the literature indicates that the study of the effects of 
political systems on economic performance is a highly contested and underdeveloped 
area of political economy scholarship. Most of the surveyed studies do not articulate 
the mechanism and process through which the political system affects the economy. 
For this paper, the influence of political systems on economic development is logical 
looped by the types of economic policies and institutions that are made through the 
structure of the political decision-making system. Hence, the first task of public policy 
                                                 
2 For those empirical studies, see Przeworski and Limongi (1993) and Sirowy and Inkeles (1990). It 
should be noted that most of the studies that argue for the beneficial effects of authoritarianism on 
economic growth were done before the end of the Cold War.   
3 Not many studies have been done in either Korean or English on the impact of the political system on 
economic development in Korea after democratisation at the end of the 1980s. Mo (2000) shows that 
differences in growth rates by political systems do not appear convincing. J.C. Lee (2001) examines the 
political system and its effects on economic liberalisation reforms – not the effects on the economy. 
J.W. Lee (2004) argues that as there is no theoretical basis nor empirical evidence favouring either 
authoritarianism or democracy for economic development, democracy together with the market system 
should be taken for the sake of more freedom.  
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is to establish proper formal (laws and regulations) institutions that will minimize 
transaction costs, secure property rights, and promote competition for efficient 
markets. Once such a institutional framework is established, a few successful factors 
for the political system can be identified. One of them is how well the political system 
reflects the nation’s economic objectives. That is, success of economic policies 
depends on how comprehensively the government represents a nation’s aggregate 
social interest or ‘encompassing interests’. In this regard, McGuire and Olson (1996) 
point out that those countries with ‘encompassing interest’ group structures grow 
more rapidly than those with a high density of narrow special-interest organisations.4  
 
With respect to an effective decision-making system, Cox and McCubbins 
(2001) argue that state decisiveness, referred to as the ability to effectively decide on 
policy issues, is a function of the political system. They further argue that the more 
‘veto points’ – or contesting points within the political system, the greater its 
indecisiveness. Presidential systems typically have more veto points than 
parliamentary systems, often leading to legislative deadlock, and rendering policies 
under the former system less decisive. Cox and McCubbins (2001) appear to focus on 
‘veto powers’ within the political system, while McGuire and Olson (1996) focus 
more on those narrow special-interest groups outside the system. This paper argues 
that the decisiveness of economic policy should take into account ‘veto powers’ both 
within and outside the political system. Another important criterion for policy success 
is its consistency over time. This will provide policy certainty and credibility based on 
which the private sector undertakes its economic activities. Policy consistency is 
equivalent to ‘resoluteness’ according to Cox and McCubbins (2001), which refers to 
the ability to stick to a policy decision. The time horizon the political system takes has 
a bearing on economic development. If the political system of a nation takes short 
time horizons, the economy will grow less rapidly than those with longer time 
horizons (Harrison 1985).   
 
In summary, the criteria for a successful political system for economic 
development include appropriate formal institutions, and the implementation of 
national economic policy that is decisive, consistent, credible, and long-term oriented. 
Importantly, it must also represent the aggregate social interest or ‘encompassing 
interest’ of the society. Against these criteria, this paper examines the impact of the 
Korean political system on its economic development. To this end, a brief descriptive 
overview of the evolution of the Korean political system and its salient characteristics 
is provided with a focus on recent years.  
 
3. Recent Evolution of the Korean Political Systems5  
 
Korea has, in principle, always had a democratic form of government based on the 
separation of powers and a system of checks and balances from the inception of the 
Republic in 1948. Syngman Rhee was elected as the first President of the Republic in 
1948, and he stepped down in 1960 in response to strong opposition against his 
authoritarian and corrupt government by students and citizens. After one year of the 
                                                 
4 Moberg (2000) argues that the impressive growth of the Swedish economy during the 1950s and 
1960s was attributable to its unique encompassing interest-group structure. 
5 Section III and IV draw on Chapter 3 (the Korean political system and its effects on the economy) of 
a forthcoming book (The Korean Economy in Transition: an Institutional Perspective) by the author, 
expected to be published in 2010 by Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., UK. 
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Chang Myon government under a parliamentary system, General Park Chung Hee 
took power by military coup in 1961. He led the country until he was assassinated in 
1979. Chun Doo Hwan was then elected president in 1980 for a seven-year term after 
a short transition period under martial law. In the presidential election held in 1987, 
Roh Tae Woo was elected for a five-year term. Both Chun and Roh were former 
generals. 
 
 The democratic advances made during the Roh Tae Woo administration set 
the stage for the election of Kim Young Sam in 1992 for a five-year term 1993-1998, 
ending the three decades of authoritarian rule under successive military dictatorships. 
The Kim Young Sam administration heralded a democratic transition and a new era of  
pluralistic democracy in Korean politics headed by the first civilian president in 32 
years. The new political system comprised a larger number of important political 
stakeholders than before including not only the president, bureaucracy, politicians and 
chaebols who had been major political players in the past, but also trade unions, 
strong interest groups, the general public and local governments. 
 
 Long-time opposition leader Kim Dae-jung was elected president and 
inaugurated in February 1998, marking a watershed for Korean politics in that it was 
the first-ever peaceful transfer of power from the ruling conservative government to a 
liberal-democratic opposition party in Korean constitutional history. Roh Moo-hyun 
was subsequently elected from Kim Dae-jung’s Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), 
and inaugurated in February 2003. In December 2007, Lee Myung-bak from the main 
opposition party, the conservative Grand National Party (GNP), was elected and was 
inaugurated in February 2008 in the second peaceful transfer of power from the ruling 
to an opposition party.  
 
 Korea’s Constitution was first adopted in 1948 when the Republic was 
established, and has been amended nine times throughout the last five decades. The 
first eight amendments were made largely for the political expediency of the then 
presidents. The ninth amendment was approved in a 1987 referendum with bipartisan 
political support. This amendment provided for the direct election of the President for 
a single five-year term and for a system of local administrative autonomy for the first 
time in 30 years. This Constitution endures to the present and has ensured the last four 
peaceful transfers of political power. It provides for a liberal democratic political 
order and basic individual rights and freedoms, the separation of powers, and the rule 
of law. The Constitution assumes a free market economy by declaring that the State 
guarantees the right to property and other economic rights, such as the right to work, 
freedom of choice of occupation and the right to free association and collective 
bargaining.  
 
Korea has a presidential system of government based on the separation of 
powers and a system of checks and balances. The Government consists of three 
branches: the executive, legislature and judiciary. Under the latest Constitution, the 
President is elected by a nationwide, equal, direct and secret ballot, and serves a 
single five-year term, with no additional terms being allowed as a safeguard against 
any individual holding power for a protracted period of time. Legislative power is 
vested in the National Assembly, a unicameral legislature. The term of office for 
members of the National Assembly is four years. In addition to the function of 
making laws, the National Assembly has the right to inspect all aspects of state affairs 
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on a regular basis as a check on executive power. The President cannot dissolve the 
National Assembly, but the National Assembly has the powers to recommend the 
impeachment of the President and removal of the Prime Minister and any officials in 
cases of violations of the Constitution or other laws in execution of official duties.  
 
 Korea’s judiciary consists of three levels of courts: the Supreme Court, High 
Court and District Court, and also includes a specialised Family Court and 
Administrative Court. The President, with the consent of the National Assembly, 
appoints the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for a single six-year term. The 
President upon the recommendation of the Chief Justice also appoints the other 
justices. The Constitutional Court was established in 1988 as an independent, 
specialised court dealing with issues such as the impeachment of politicians, the 
dissolution of a political party, the constitutionality of legislation, and for 
safeguarding human rights.  
 
 According to the Constitution, local governments deal with matters pertaining 
to the welfare of local residents and property issues, and also establish, within the 
limit of national laws, rules and regulations regarding local autonomy. A local 
government is required to have a council. Laws at the national level determine the 
organisation and powers of the council. The chief executives and members of local 
government councils are elected by direct vote for four-year terms. 
 
4. Salient Characteristics of Korean Politics 
 
Korea’s latest Constitution follows closely the norms of advanced democratic 
countries, and the formal structure of government is little different from those of 
Western models. However, salient characteristics of Korean culture have shaped the 
development of politics in a unique way. The culture underlying the recent 
developments in Korean politics over the last five decades has been Confucianism. 
Although Korean society has changed significantly, Confucian values, such as an 
emphasis on personal relationships, hierarchical social structures and respect for 
authority, still remain strong.6 These Confucian values have remained influential in 
shaping political development in Korea, maintaining some sui generis characteristics 
as follows. 
 
 Paternalistic Political Leadership: further to being hierarchical, Korea has 
also been a paternalistic society under Confucian influence. In such a society, people, 
including politicians are often judged according to Confucian values of good morals, 
humanistic attitudes and educational achievements. Political leaders are expected to 
be paternalistic with the quality of being morally strong, benevolent and 
knowledgeable, humble-minded, compassionate and virtuous. Such an emphasis on 
leadership has rendered Korean politics largely personality-based, rather than 
institutionally based. Nowhere is the importance of personality in Korean politics 
more obvious than in the political party system. The main political parties in Korea 
are largely recognised through their leaders. It is almost impossible to distinguish 
between the platforms and programs of the various political parties. In addition, 
political parties in Korea are subordinate to their leaders. Rather than acting as 
                                                 
6 For salient characteristics of Korean culture, see Kwon (2008: 64-85). 
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channels for political dialogue between society and political leaders, political parties 
are seen as followings for political leaders (Helgesen, 1998: 250).  
 
The ‘personality cult’ approach in Korean politics has been reinforced by 
various political systems and culture. Candidates for the election of National 
Assembly members are nominated by the party leader – not by the local party 
members as in Western advanced countries. Therefore, any party member who is 
interested in running for national office cannot dare to challenge his/her party leader. 
This type of party political system is vulnerable to corruption. As people vote 
essentially for a person or personal background, legitimate considerations such as 
‘policies’ are secondary. Under these circumstances, institutionalised party politics or 
disciplined political parties have never taken root, and a number of them have come 
and gone as attested by several new parties created in conjunction with the 2007 
presidential election alone. The prospect of developing a limited number of 
encompassing parties in Korea looks dim.  
 
 Power Concentration: reflecting the Confucian influence, political power in 
Korea has been highly concentrated in the president who is also typically the leader of 
a political party. The president is surrounded by an interconnected elite group 
comprising of big businesses, bureaucrats, and politicians all bound together by 
regional affiliations and educational and friendship ties (Helgesen, 1998: 246; J.C. 
Lee, 2001: 197).  
 
 Regionalism: another influential and visible characteristic of politics in Korea 
is a regionalism that has had a destructive effect on political developments over the 
last five decades. In Korea's family and clan-orientated society, strong emphasis is 
also placed on one's place of origin; a descendent of a particular place will always 
belong to that place despite being born in another. Regionalism can thus be seen as a 
natural outcome of the Korean collective mentality. Successive governments in the 
recent past as well as authoritarian regimes have exacerbated the problem through 
utilising regionalism as a means of maintaining state power. Regionalism is embedded 
in Korean politics to the extent that people often make important political decisions 
based on their regional affiliations. If a presidential candidate comes from a particular 
provincial area, people from the region will support that candidate because he/she 
‘represents their interests’. Since a political party is identified by its leader and the 
leader is identified by the region where the leader was born and raised, the region of a 
party is identified by the region of the party leader.7 Regionalism and the ‘personality 
cult’ mentality exert significant influence over politics and continue to impede the 
capacity for democracy to function efficiently. 
 
 The Role of Non-government Organisations (NGOs): Korean politics entered a 
new landscape in 2000 when the Integrated Election Laws changed, allowing non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to participate in election campaigns, although 
banning them from holding rallies for or against particular candidates (Asiaweek 
                                                 
7 This was clearly witnessed during the so-called three Kims era from the 1980s to the 1990s during 
which the four major political parties were: one led by President Kim Young Sam based in 
Gyeongsang Province, one by President Kim Dae-jung based in Jeolla Province, and one by former 
Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil based in Chungcheong Province. After the three Kims era was over, the 
power of personality-cult based politics has been incrementally weakening, while regionalism is still 
strong in Korean politics.  
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2000). There were nearly 70,000 NGOs registered with the central and local 
governments as of 2000. They are supported by society. In 2003, for example, 78.3 
percent of the sample indicated a high degree of trust in NGOs, while the 
corresponding figure for political parties was only 14.9 percent, with the legislature 
rating 15.4 percent (Y.Y. Lee, 2009). The weak and unstable party system encourages 
the public to seek political efficacy outside the formal legislative process.  There are 
also strong incentives for NGOs. A number of prominent NGO leaders were 
‘rewarded’ with appointments of key government posts both under the Roh and Lee 
administrations (H.Y. Lee, 2004; Chosun Ilbo, 2009a). As Korea transits from an 
industrial society to an information society, political participation of NGOs will be 
expedited as networking between them and among their members will be further 
facilitated.8  
 
 Prevalence of Large-Scale Social Movements: mass civic actions played a 
crucial role in undermining Korea’s authoritarian regimes prior to 1988 and in the 
transition to democracy. Since then, Korea has unambiguously been ranked as a full 
democracy by all international indicators. Nonetheless, there is the continuing 
prevalence of large-scale social movements that engage in widespread and frequent 
popular demonstrations and other protest activities, often illegal. There was an annual 
average of 372 protests per year over the period 1988-2007. The vast majority of 
protests are characterised as ‘violent and disruptive’, and mass public demonstrations 
such as the candlelight vigils from April to August in 2008 have the potential to 
virtually paralyse Korean governments (S.H. Kim, 2009). 
 
 A number of explanations can be made for the prevalence of violent and 
disruptive mass civic demonstrations in Korea. They include: a large number of 
NGOs networked through the Internet; the underdevelopment of the party system to 
represent social interests; a legacy of the democratic transition process from the 
military dictatorship prior to 1988; the large gap between actual government 
responsiveness and impractical and over-exaggerated policy promises under  the 
single five-year term of the presidency; and the lack of social trust in politicians due 
to the prevalence of corruption scandals and uncivilised behaviours in public places. 
In addition, government responses to violent disruptions could be a critical reason for 
their prevalence. The large number of persistent protests over time implies that there 
prevails a perception in Korean society that the government takes heed of such 
protests, and that illegal activities are condoned. Indeed there have been numerous 
cases in which the government gave in to the demands of protesters. It appears that 
imposition of laws on illegal activities has not been adequately implemented; the 
incumbent minister in charge of such protests, with his/her typically short tenure, 
seeks to settle the issues quickly with no adequate punishment of illegal activities, nor 
with any serious concern with the long-term ramifications of the settlements. All this 
indicates that Korean democracy has yet to be consolidated for its stability.  
 
5. Impacts of the Korean Political System on the Economy 
 
A. Economic Development under the Authoritarian Regimes, 1961-87 
                                                 
8 During the authoritarian regimes from 1948 to the end of 1980s, the role of Korea’s students was 
highly important in Korean politics. They were regarded as the group of ‘social conscience’ and stood 
up against social injustice, dictatorships, and corruption under the banner of democracy, justice, and 
unification of the nation. From the 1990s, students’ role in Korean politics has ebbed remarkably. 
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The authoritarian regimes from the early 1960s with a strong central authority were 
quite successful in achieving a high annual average growth rate of 8.6 percent over 
the 1962-1987 period. They have been regarded as the model of the authoritarian 
capitalist developmental state (S.J. Han, 1995). Obviously the authoritarian regimes 
were quite successful in meeting those criteria that requires the political system to be 
conducive to economic development. The Park and Chun military regimes, which 
took a grip on political power by military means, maintained a vision and objectives 
consistent with the national interest of rapid economic development, as a way of 
legitimising their political power. A widely accepted objective of rapid economic 
growth prevailed in Korean society during the 1960s and 1970s, which was promoted 
by public campaigns and reinforced by strong nationalism. After the prolonged war-
stricken poverty, all citizens assigned high priority to the economic growth of the 
nation. In this context, the predatory behaviour of state officials was not of serious 
concern in Korea. Similarly, special interest groups, either suppressed by the central 
authorities or non-existent, could not distract from the encompassing national interests 
in the growth objective. 
 
The military regimes established and maintained a proper institutional 
framework. Even though they led a state-directed economy with extensive 
intervention, the regimes maintained a free market economy by securing private 
property rights and provided financial incentives for business and protection against 
foreign competition. The regimes also maintained competition within the domestic 
market by ensuring at least two companies operated in one industrial sector, unless it 
was run as a state-owned monopoly. In addition, the Park government established an 
autonomous and effective state apparatus, exemplified by the Economic Planning 
Board (EPB), which provided a high degree of autonomy to a bureaucracy staffed by 
talented technocrats. It also established economic research institutes under most 
government ministries. The government provided a proper educational infrastructure 
for human resource development and maintained a balance between the demand and 
supply of labour in the market, thereby maintaining real wage increments equal to the 
rises of productivity until the end of the 1980s (S.K. Kim, 2001). This high real wage 
growth served to dampen social discontent (Amsden, 1989: 10). 
 
Economic policies implemented by the authoritarian regimes were decisive, 
consistent, credible, flexible and long-term oriented. From 1962 until the end of the 
1980s, the government was able to implement consistently its consecutive five-year 
economic plans with specific targets. The underlying thrust of economic policies was 
rapid economic growth, although their directives evolved as the economy developed. 
With the constitutional clauses that permitted President Park to be elected for an 
unlimited number of times and President Chun to serve for a seven-year term, their 
time horizons were long, reflected by the consecutive five-year economic plans.  
 
The Roh Tae Woo administration over the five-year period 1988-1993 pursued 
political democratisation, ending the authoritarianism of over four decades. All the 
merit of the authoritarian regimes with respect to economic development dissipated 
with them. The political transition imposed tremendous economic adjustment costs on 
the country. Labour disputes, which had remained suppressed under the authoritarian 
regimes for the sake of maximum economic growth and political stability, became 
rampant and violent, and wages rose far in excess of productivity. Real estate 
speculation flared up, and economic injustice was exacerbated. Throughout this 
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adjustment process, the Korean economy lost part of its economic growth vitality and 
international competitiveness. 
 
B. Economic Development under the Democratic Administrations, 1993-2008 
The Kim Young Sam government was inaugurated in 1993 as the first civilian regime 
in three decades and made a remarkable transition in the Korean political terrain. The 
new political system comprised a larger number of political stakeholders, fostered a 
more diverse and activist civil society, and made the system of political decision 
making more complex and difficult (S.H. Kim, 1997). For example, the Kim Young 
Sam government ended up abandoning the labour reform bill that had passed through 
the National Assembly due to militant labour activism. The new government  
embarked on a ‘A Five-Year Plan for the New Economy’ with a focus on 
globalisation. However, the new civilian democratic regime was relatively unstable 
because of the presence of strong interest groups and with the decline of central 
authority. The government lost decisiveness and consistency in its economic policy, 
as attested by its five-year economic plan being left unattended.  
 
Although the Kim Young Sam government heralded a new era of political 
pluralism, democracy remained confined to a purely procedural process of providing a 
free and fair election and the constitutional guarantee of political participation (S.H. 
Kim, 1997; S.J. Han, 1995; Lee and Lee, 2008). The fundamental tenets of the 
economic policy of the Kim Young Sam government remained the same as the 
preceding authoritarian regimes, i.e., they were committed to a ‘growth-first’ strategy 
without undertaking meaningful economic redistribution (Y.S. Ha, 1997). His 
government failed to undertake serious institutional reforms other than introducing the 
real name deposit system and ended in financial crisis.   
 
It was the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments that have 
differentiated their regimes from the conservative administrations of the early 
democratisation era. These administrations promoted the idea of participatory 
democracy, which meant the active participation of citizens in the policy-making 
process, the democratization of industrial relations, and the monitoring of state and 
business actors by a proactive civil society (Y.H. Lee, 2005).  However, as Lee and 
Lee (2008) argue, the two regimes were still in the process of democratic 
consolidation which required not only procedural democracy, but also a democratic 
culture among the political leadership and civil society, whereby political leaders are 
equipped with the skills of political mediation, coordination and compromise, and 
civil society is required to accept the rule of law and partake in the political process. 
The consolidation process of Korean democracy has yet to be completed (Lee and Lee, 
2008; J.C. Lee, 2001; J.W. Lee, 2004).  
 
The slow process of democratic consolidation is attributable to a number of 
factors. The political leadership has not cast off the authoritarian style of leadership. 
This would be attributable to paternalistic leadership with concentrated political 
power, as examined above. Under pluralistic democracy, a large number of new 
political stakeholders have emerged. There is a lack of compromise among political 
stakeholders, thereby raising political confrontations and instability. As examined 
above, some stakeholders have occasionally applied tactics beyond the rule of law in 
asserting their political interests.  
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During the period of democratic consolidation, neither the Kim Dae-jung nor 
the Roh Moo-hyun government was regarded as successful in terms of economic 
policy. In its early stages, Kim Dae-jung’s government managed quite successful the 
financial crisis and undertook various economic reforms. This was attributable not 
only to the leader’s decisiveness and resoluteness but also to the whole society being 
united behind him for a drastic shift in the economic policy paradigm to overcome the 
devastating crisis. President Kim’s approach to economic reform was through 
coercion and intervention rather than relying on market principles. Once the exigency 
period was over, President Kim Dae-jung could not accomplish much due to his lack 
of coordination skills (Lee and Lee, 2008) and a high density of strong interest groups 
that applied militant and even illegal tactics for political gains. Furthermore, his 
presidential authority and credibility was weakened by corruption cases in which his 
son and close allies were involved. 
  
The Roh Moo-hyun government over the period 2003-2008 was disreputable 
for its political instability which is in turn attributable to various factors such as his 
lack of democratic leadership and the immature democratic orientation of civil society. 
His ‘participatory democracy’ was aimed at social cohesion and voluntary 
cooperation with the state by fostering civil society organisations as a ‘third sector’. 
Roh’s stance raised expectations among various social groups and led to a prevalence 
of illegal strikes by unions and uncontrollable street demonstrations by interest groups 
or NGOs making ‘an explosion of demands’ throughout the five-year term (H.Y. Lee, 
2004). Corruption scandals tainted his regime during the first year in which close 
associates were implicated. Roh’s approval rating dipped with these developments 
and in less than a year’s time his party (the MDP) was split into two factions 
supporting and opposing the President. Roh loyalists formed a new party, the Uri 
Party with only 44 of the 299 National Assembly seats (Fukuyama et al., 2005). With 
such minority support in the National Assembly, Roh was unable to pursue his 
legislative agenda.   
 
President Roh and the Uri Party were dedicated to broad and highly sensitive 
reform agendas such as the decentralisation of administration as part of its regionally 
balanced development agenda; reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea; 
amelioration of the income gap between rich and poor; a reinterpretation of Korean 
history from the 1940s to the 1960s; and a stabilisation in the speculative hikes of real 
estate prices (Hahm and Kim, 2005). Public opinion on his reform agenda was 
polarised into conservative and progressive positions, and the conflicts between the 
two blocs escalated over time. These political conflicts culminated in March 2004 in 
an impeachment resolution by the National Assembly for the first time in Korean 
history for Roh’s speech in support of his party in the then forthcoming National 
Assembly election. In May 2004, the Constitutional Court ruled that Roh had indeed 
violated the electoral law but the violation was not enough to warrant removal of a 
directly elected president (Hahm and Kim, 2005).9 In the meantime, because of public 
dissatisfaction with the disruptive impeachment process, the 2004 election results 
delivered a resounding victory to Roh’s Uri Party, which won a majority of seats in 
                                                 
9 The resolution of this constitutional crisis from the impeachment has demonstrated two important 
aspects of the Korean political system. First, the authority of the judiciary was enhanced in holding 
both the executive and legislature accountable. Second, it demonstrated the viability of Korea’s 
relatively new democratic institutions (Fukuyama et al., 2005).  
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the National Assembly (Fukuyama et al., 2005). Despite this victory, public 
dissatisfaction with the President’s policy and reforms soared rapidly, and Roh’s party 
dramatically lost a series of by-elections to the GNP, and the party eventually 
disappeared by the time of the 2007 presidential election, demonstrating again the 
volatility of Korean democracy (Lie and Park 2006). 
 
The Roh Moo-hyun government was not able to make significant 
accomplishments for economic development because of its lack of democratic 
leadership and the lack of encompassing interest, decisiveness, consistency and 
credibility in its attempted policies. Added to this were uncooperative rent-seeking 
interest groups employing non-democratic tactics for their claims. In terms of 
economic policy, the Roh administration posited a ‘free and fair’ market order with 
equitable distribution of income as the strategic economic objective (Y.H. Lee, 2005). 
When public opinion on his reform agendas was polarised into conservative and 
progressive positions, and the conflicts between the two blocs escalated, President 
Roh revealed his lack of democratic leadership and inability to compromise, as 
attested by his divisive rhetoric and promotion of the confrontation. All these 
developments together with the impeachment resolution exacerbated political 
instability. With such political instability, introduction of reliable economic policies 
and institutional reforms became untenable, thereby contributing to the nation’s 
sluggish economic performance from 2003 to 2007.  
 
6. Evaluation of Lee Myung-bak administration since 2008 
 
February 2008 began with the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak from the 
conservative Grand National Party (GNP), marking the end of a 10-year period of 
progressive government. President Lee was elected on a platform of revitalising the 
economy through business-friendly policies, job creation and tax reductions. The 
GNP also won a clear victory in the April 2008 National Assembly election, giving 
the governing party the largest majority in the legislature since democratisation in 
1987.  
 
 President Lee has so far failed to make a significant contribution not only to 
democratic consolidation but to social cohesion, both of which are closely related. 
This has been manifest in a number of ways. The first was his selection of Cabinet 
Ministers from his close associates based on his Alma Mater and church and from a 
wealthy area. During the National Assembly’s approval process, a number of the 
candidates were accused of a variety of improprieties such as real estate speculation 
and tax evasion, and a few of them were subsequently withdrawn, forcing the 
President to apologise (Moon, 2009; Han, 2009). This incident alienated a large 
proportion of Korean citizens, who labelled Lee’s Cabinet as being made up of only 
the wealthy and land-owning class of Korean society (Kihl, 2009).  
 
Then in August 2008, President Lee angered Korea’s Buddhist community for 
alleged discrimination. There were claims that because of Lee’s strong Christian faith, 
senior public servants in government had been evangelising for Christianity and 
disparaging Buddhism (Moon, 2009: 124).10 In this regard, Kang (2009), an 
                                                 
10 A survey found that almost 40 percent of Koreans felt that religious conflicts had intensified since 
the start of the Lee administration (Korea Times, 2010). 
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influential columnist with the Chosun Ilbo, and Kihl (2009) argue that President Lee 
should be the leader of the entire nation, rather than special interests. After being 
criticised as a hardline conservative with his government made up of rich cronies 
(Chosun Ilbo, 2009b; JoongAng Daily, 2009a), President Lee set out in June 2009 to 
remedy his fragile base of political support by ‘strengthening the ranks of centrists’ in 
his administration. As part of this strategy, the President nominated in September 
2009 Chung Un-chan, a former Seoul National University President with ties to the 
opposition Democratic Party as new Prime Minister along with a number of other new 
ministers.  
 
President Lee is criticised as lacking in national leadership skills of political 
coordination and compromise. Perhaps because of his long career as a chief executive 
officer of Hyundai Construction and as Mayor of Seoul City for four years, reinforced 
by Korea’s political culture of paternalistic leadership, he has not developed such 
political skills. While the often unruly and irresponsible actions of the National 
Assembly are not strictly the fault of President Lee, and owe much to Korea’s 
immature democratic political culture, his top-down, dictatorial style and lack of 
political skills in compromise and negotiation, have made the situation much worse. 
This style of administration reflected in his nickname of the ‘bulldozer’ and corporate 
and mayoral reputation for ramming through changes is not practical in Korea’s 
national democratic system with its many veto points (Kihl, 2009). Therefore, the Lee 
administration has received little support or cooperation from the legislative branch in 
the face of a sustained deadlock and occasional violence in the National Assembly. In 
this regard, D.J. Kim (2009), a renowned columnist from Chosun Ilbo, which is well-
known as a supporter of the conservative GNP, argues that President Lee lacks the 
political skills of compromising with National Assembly members and the opposing 
factions within his own party. Similarly, Kihl (2009) argues that President Lee acts 
more like ‘a business executive than as a politician’. The remainder of this section 
assesses the Lee Myung-bak administration as in February 2010 from the evaluation 
criteria outlined above: encompassing interests, decisiveness, consistency, credibility, 
flexibility and long-term orientation.  
 
Encompassing interests: major projects President Lee has proposed do not 
appear to reflect the aggregate social interest. His grand cross-Korea canal project 
proposed as one of his key election pledges was abandoned because of strong 
objections from the general public and from a faction of his own party.  He then 
proposed the four-river restoration project, with an estimated cost of 22.2 trillion won, 
amounting to 2.0 percent of GDP, which has become another controversial and 
divisive proposal. About 58 percent of citizens do not believe the government’s 
announcement of the no-relationship between the cross-Korea canal and the four-river 
projects (Hankyoreh,  2010a), and the number of citizens supporting the four-river 
project remains under 30 percent (Hankyoreh, 2010b). D.J.Kim (2010) adds that 56.8 
percent of Korean citizens are opposed to the projects and only 37.3 percent of them 
support them. The main reason for such low support is the public’s suspicion of the 
project as a prelude to the cross-Korea canal and the seemingly reckless pursuit of the 
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project without adequate prior examination in order to complete it within President 
Lee’s five-year term.11  
 
Another controversial and divisive project is the Sejong City project. The 
original plan was created through a bipartisan agreement in 2005 to establish a new 
administrative capital and to contribute to the nation’s balanced development by 
relocating a number of ministries to the City. President Lee, who supported the 
original plan during the presidential campaign, proposed a modification of the original 
plan thereby developing the City for new industries without relocating any ministry of 
the government. This may hollow out industries from other regions creating further 
controversy. Instead of attempting to elicit broad-based public approval, President Lee 
has said ‘this is not something for public approval or disapproval’, implying ‘just 
follow me’ as these two projects are good for the nation’s future (Hankyoreh, 
2010b).12 This runs counter to the democratic principle. 
 
 Decisiveness: the Lee government appears to fare quite poorly with this 
criterion. Because of the presidential system, the Lee government encounters strong 
internal and external veto points, leading to legislative deadlock. Despite the 
governing party holding a large majority in the legislature, it is factioned with a strong 
schism in terms of personality and policy. As examined earlier, Korea has a very 
strong and activist civil society and trade union movements. Han (2009) points out 
that the candle light vigils, organised by civil society groups, paralysed the Lee 
government for a few months. Hence, it is apprehensive about passing potentially 
unpopular laws without support from the opposing faction of the government party as 
well as opposition parties, as NGOs and labour unions could easily provoke another 
wave of destabilising protests with President Lee’s low approval rate (Oliver 2009). 
 There is also a parliamentary convention that prior agreement be reached on any 
legislation before a formal vote, thereby leading to interminable delays (JoongAng 
Daily, 2009b). Constitutionally, even if the President does not have a majority in the 
National Assembly, the President still holds a unilateral prerogative via decree powers 
to enforce his preferred policies (Tsai, 2009). Given his direct and uncompromising 
style, it seems unlikely that Lee would not use the presidential decree powers if 
National Assembly opposition is the main concern or obstruction. However, whether 
he would use his presidential decree or not depends on his public approval rate, and 
the current rate appears to be too low to warrant his use of the decrees.   
 
 Consistency: due to a variety of political problems at the beginning of the Lee 
government as examined above, the third criterion of consistency has also been 
lacking in the administration’s policies, activities and personnel. The US beef import 
crisis is perhaps the exemplary case. On April 15, 2008 just before his first official 
visit to the US, President Lee, without public consultation, announced that the 
government was rescinding Korea’s ban on beef imports from the United States that 
had been imposed after a case of mad cow disease in 2003. This prompted massive 
                                                 
11 As D.J.Kim (2010) suggests, the best approach under the current circumstances would be to 
implement the four-river projects in a few steps, taking a project for one of the four rivers at first as an 
experiment. Based on the results, the government would then decide on the future of the remaining 
four-river projects.   




public demonstrations across the country and developed into an anti-government 
movement with anti-American overtones (Hundt, 2008; Moon, 2009; Kirk, 2008). 
Eventually, after months of political paralysis, physical repression and public 
apologies, the government backed down and settled on imposing more stringent 
regulations on U.S. beef imports, and the entire Cabinet and various presidential aides 
offered their resignations (Moon, 2009).  
 
 In addition to abandonment of the cross-Korea canal proposal, as mentioned 
above, the exchange rate policy of the Lee administration lacked consistency. The 
government initially pursued a weak won policy to bolster exports as part of its 
growth-oriented strategy, which quickly backfired with sharp international price rises 
in oil and other commodities. In response, the government attempted to appreciate the 
currency, but then failed to do so in October 2008 during a steep devaluation of the 
won in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC). In the face of the GFC, 
President Lee was also accused of lacking policy coordination among ministries and 
agencies, aggravating policy inconsistency (Moon, 2009).13  
 
 Credibility: the constant problems and scandals early in his administration, 
apparently the product of poor democratic leadership skills and lack of sensitivity to 
public concerns have contributed to the damage to President Lee’s credibility. Most of 
Lee’s election promises appear to have been irresponsible sloganeering, with little 
chance of achievement within his presidential term. Lee was elected on the so-called 
‘747’ slogan: seven percent annual GDP growth rate over the next 10 years, 
US$40,000 per capita income, and Korea becoming the 7th largest economy in the 
world within 10 years. Additionally, President Lee advocated further deregulation, 
privatisation and greater tax incentives for R&D. However, the actual annual 
economic growth rates have fell far behind his target rate of seven percent, and no 
significant initiatives have been undertaken for his growth-oriented strategy either in 
institutional changes or in economic policy measures other than a weak won policy, as 
mentioned above (Hundt, 2008). In addition, abandonment of the across-Korea canal 
project, the debacle with the US beef import issue, the broken promise of developing 
the Sejong City by law, all of which forced him to make his unprecedented series of 
public apologies, have damaged his credibility as well as policy consistency (Kihl, 
2009; Chosun Ilbo, 2009c). This is perhaps best indicated by Lee’s woeful standing in 
public opinion polling between mid-2008 and late-2009. Lee’s approval rating, which 
peaked at 51.1 percent in March 2008, had plummeted to 17.1 percent by June of that 
year (Han, 2009). His approval rate has improved to 44.0 percent in February 2010 
after he set out to strengthen his political support base by promoting his new-found 
‘centrist pragmatism’ in June 2009 when his approval rate was 25.3 percent (Korea 
Times, 2010).   
 
 Long-term orientation: it has been argued above that Korea’s single, five-year 
presidential term is bound to lead to short-sighted policies, and this has been observed 
many times in Korea (JoongAng Daily, 2009c). It appears that despite any intentions 
to the contrary that might have existed, the government’s mistakes have resulted in a 
                                                 
13 Han (2009) also notes that within 116 days of Lee’s election, all the Presidential secretaries 
originally appointed had been forced to resign, indicating the inconsistency in personnel. Moon (2009) 
argues that mismanagement, inconsistency and confusing policy signals has resulted in a lack of market 
confidence in the economic management skills of the administration. 
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series of urgent rolling crises, which can only detract from responsible long-term 
policy. Jang (2008) argues that the above lack of credibility is due to ‘the short-
sightedness and rash comportment of a president who cannot see even six months in 
the future’. Han (2009) also argues that all of Lee’s initial policy proposals such as 
making changes to English education, privatisation of utilities including the water 
company, the grand canal project, deregulating public schools, and seeking to control 
broadcasters, were ‘short-sighted’ and all attracted significant opposition. The four-
river project is also a short-sighted project which the President attempts to complete 
within his term. He is quoted as saying that ‘the nation's future depends on science and 
technology and education’ (Korea Herald, 2010). Given the nation’s strong drive toward 
a knowledge-based economy, such a huge civil engineering project, which has low 
forward and backward economic linkage effects, cannot be an appropriate long-term 
project.  
 
In mid-2009, with his weakened presidential authority together with a very 
low public approval rating, and with the lack of support from the National Assembly, 
it appeared unlikely that the Lee government would be able to undertake significant 
institutional reforms and economic measures that meet the policy success criteria. 
However, by the second half of 2009, the President had recognised that the situation 
was untenable, and has assumed the political middle ground with a more pragmatic 
and centrist policy to strengthen his political support base. Since then, opinion polls 
have improved substantially. It remains to be seen whether Lee’s new-found centrist 




Economic development is a complex phenomenon with a variety of contributing 
factors. Recognising the complementarity of the multiple factors for economic 
development, this paper has examined the impacts of the political system on 
economic development in Korea from the authoritarian military regimes of the 1960s 
and 1970s to the present liberal-democratic political system. To this end, a set of 
criteria against which to assess the impact of the political system on economic 
performance have been developed through a literature review. They include: the 
establishment of proper institutions to minimise transaction costs, secure property 
rights and promote competition; and the implementation of national economic policy 
with encompassing interests, decisiveness, consistency, credibility, and a long-term 
orientation.  
 
The Korean political system has made remarkable progress over a short period 
of time and its democracy has matured substantially. It made a historic transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy with a corresponding constitutional reform in 1987. 
Since then, peaceful power transfers have occurred twice from the ruling party to an 
opposition party, and Korea has experienced even an impeachment trial of the 
president. The contents of Korea’s existing Constitution follow closely the norms in 
Western democratic countries, and the formal structure of government is little 
different from those of politically advanced models. However, the Korean political 
system maintains some sui generis characteristics resulting from its idiosyncratic 
culture and political development process.  
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 It is generally considered that the authoritarian regimes in Korea were quite 
successful in terms of economic development. The regimes were committed to 
economic development without serious predatory activities. They established proper 
institutions for secured property rights and market competition, and established 
policy-making organisations staffed with efficient officials. Economic policies met 
the success criteria of decisiveness, consistency, credibility and long-term orientation. 
The military regimes also met the criterion of encompassing interests of the general 
public, excluding special-interest organisations, including unions which remained 
repressed. However, the merits those authoritarian regimes had with respect to 
economic development all dissipated with the political transition which imposed 
tremendous economic adjustment costs.  
  
 The Korean political system under democracy has become much more 
complex and difficult with a large number of political stakeholders and a diverse and 
active civil society. Korean democracy has been in the process of consolidation. For a 
completion of democratic consolidation, political leaders need to be equipped with the 
democratic leadership skills of political compromise, and civil society is required to 
accept the rule of law and partake responsibly in the political process. The Kim 
Young Sam government was not able to generate social consensus on its national 
economic policy and lost decisiveness, consistency and credibility in its policies. His 
administration also failed to undertake serious institutional reforms thereby resulting 
in the 1997 financial crisis.  
 
Neither the Kim Dae-jung nor Roh Moo-hyun government succeeded in the 
consolidation of democracy due to a lack of leadership and an immature civil society.  
President Kim Dae-jung was quite successful at the beginning of his term in 
managing the financial crisis and implementing various institutional reforms, largely 
because the whole society was united behind him to overcome the devastating crisis. 
Beyond this, though, he could not accomplish much due to his lack of coordination 
skills, and his presidential authority was weakened by corruption cases, undermining 
his policy credibility. Because of the same reasons as for the Kim Dae-jung 
government, the Roh Moo-hyun administration was not able to make significant 
accomplishments in economic development. Roh started with a broad agenda of 
political reforms and economic policies. However, public opinion on his policy 
agenda soon became polarised and civil and political conflicts escalated. Under such 
social fragmentation and political instability, the government failed to implement 
significant institutional reforms and new policies that meet the success policy criteria, 
thereby contributing to the sluggish economic performance over the 2003-2007 period. 
 
While it is far too early to make a full assessment of the Lee administration, it 
has started quite poorly over its first two years. President Lee has certainly failed to 
contribute to democratic consolidation and social cohesion, and has exposed his lack 
of leadership skills of political coordination and compromise. This has resulted in a 
number of legislative deadlocks over various issues. He has abandoned a series of 
election promises. All this has damaged his policy decisiveness, consistency and 
credibility. He has also introduced some controversial and divisive projects that lack 
aggregate social interest and long-term orientation.  
 
 The underlying weakness of the Korean political systems under the 1987 
Constitution has been demonstrated by recent democratic governments. In addition to 
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deficient democratic consolidation and a civic culture of disruptive protests, one of 
the major problems with the Korean political system under the existing Constitution is 
the system’s inherent instability resulting from the instability and factionalism of its 
political parties and the single five-year term of the presidency. Korean political 
parties, built around the leaders’ personality and regionalism, are poorly 
institutionalised. They are unable to develop a stable party politics and are vulnerable 
to corruption. Under the single five-year term, presidential candidates are likely to 
make impractical policy promises, and once elected, the president has strong 
incentives to pursue short-run economic programs. Once disenchanted with the 
president, electorates are likely to elect opposition party members to the National 
Assembly and resort to mass civic protests, raising the prospect of minority 
government and political deadlock. Under such political instability, the government is 
less likely to meet the success policy criteria with institutional reforms and economic 
policy measures. Society becomes aware of the lack of decisiveness, consistency, 
credibility and long-term orientation of development policy, which renders the task of 
reaching policy consensus more difficult.  
 
Clearly, the political system is an important variable for economic 
development and is not a matter of ceteris paribus. Even if all else remains the same, 
the prospects for the Korean economy will be tainted because of the low level of 
democratic consolidation, the unstable party system and inappropriate civic culture. 
All this is highly attributable to Korean culture that changes only at a glacial pace. In 
order to improve its economic prospects and to attain the nation’s long-cherished goal 
of the status of an advanced country, Korea needs to accelerate the democratic 
consolidation process and improve its party political system.   
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